Baybridge. Anatomy of a chinese information influence ecosystem

INTRODUCTION

Online disinformation has become a major challenge for our democratic societies. The development of social networks and the acceleration of information dissemination have created new opportunities for malicious actors seeking to manipulate opinions and interfere in political processes. While Russia’s information warfare tactics have dominated public discourse and scholarly attention, other state actors have been developing their own distinct approaches to informational influence. The People’s Republic of China, though less frequently examined through the lens of active disinformation campaigns, has nonetheless constructed sophisticated mechanisms for shaping international narratives. These operations, distinguished by their commercial camouflage and bureaucratic complexity, exploit digital infrastructures in ways that diverge markedly from the more direct propaganda models typically associated with authoritarian information manipulation. Yet this very complexity, as our investigation reveals, generates its own vulnerabilities and contradictions. Since 2022, a series of investigations has uncovered a vast ecosystem of inauthentic websites, linked to Chinese companies officially offering digital marketing and public relations services and, in reality, also serving to disseminate content aligned with Beijing’s positions to foreign audiences. These works, conducted successively by different research teams, have gradually revealed the scope, modi operandi, and interconnections of this network dubbed ‘GLASSBRIDGE’. Our analysis, however, reveals that the network’s operational center of gravity lies not in Shanghai alone, but also within the Greater Bay Area— that ambitious megalopolitan project encompassing Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macau. The key stakeholders, their academic affiliations, and their business activities are deeply embedded in this region’s unique political-economic ecosystem, where the boundaries between public mission and private enrichment prove remarkably porous. We therefore propose the designation ‘BAYBRIDGE’ to more accurately reflect both the geographic anchoring and the structural ambiguities that characterize this infrastructure. The progressive unveiling of this infrastructure’s technical architecture and operational dysfunction requires careful examination of how successive investigations have contributed to our understanding of this paradoxical system.

The first landmark study on the subject was published in August 2022 by Mandiant, a renowned American cybersecurity company now part of Google Cloud. The result of a long investigation about ‘HaiEnergy operation’, this report^(x) describes in detail how a Chinese public relations company based in Shanghai, Shanghai Haixun Technology Co. Ltd, used its digital infrastructure (servers, domain names, websites), normally devoted to marketing and press release dissemination, to host and disseminate pro-Chinese government propaganda, particularly targeting American audiences. The Mandiant team identified a network of at least 72 seemingly independent websites, presenting themselves as legitimate media covering news from different countries, but in reality all linked to Haixun and publishing content in 11 languages promoting Chinese interests while criticizing the United States and their allies. This foundational discovery highlighted a new mode of state disinformation, relying on private actors and multiple fake media outlets to reach diverse audiences. The following year, in November 2023, a new investigation conducted by the NCSC Joint Analysis Team,^(x) including the Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS), considerably enriched knowledge about this network. Beyond confirming Haixun’s involvement, the NCSC report revealed the central role of another Chinese digital marketing company, Shenzhen Haimai Yunxiang Media Co. Ltd, and especially the use of newswires as the backbone of the disinformation infrastructure. Korean analysts were able to trace the path of propaganda content, injected at the source into these newswires by Haimai, then automatically picked up and disseminated on a large scale by an entire network of websites posing as legitimate media in different countries, particularly in Southeast Asia. This ‘syndication’ mechanism allows rapid and massive amplification of messages while obscuring their real origin. The NCSC thus brought to light a particularly sophisticated system, combining technical content generation and viral dissemination capability.

In February 2024, the understanding of this network’s operation and purposes reached a new level thanks to a thorough study^(x) published by The Citizen Lab, a research laboratory at the University of Toronto. Naming the operation ‘PAPERWALL’, researchers focused their efforts on the Haimai company and managed to precisely map a set of more than 100 fake news sites active in thirty countries, including about ten specifically targeting French-speaking audiences. Through advanced content analysis, the study reveals a balanced mix of legitimate information, often directly copied from real local media, and elements of pro-Chinese propaganda or pure information manipulation (conspiracy theories, ad hominem attacks against dissidents, etc.). The report emphasises that this approach makes it possible to build both credibility and a substantial audience while propagating biased narratives, and remaining largely under the radar of the public and authorities. Citizen Lab thus highlights the formidable effectiveness of this mechanism combining familiarity and manipulation. A few months later, in October 2024, a new milestone was set by the publication of a study^(x) by two researchers from Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, who examined the specific targeting of Southeast Asia. Their main contribution was revealing the technical and editorial interconnections between the ‘Haixun network’ and another network, called ‘SeaPR Network’, also dedicated to disseminating manipulated information to Southeast Asian public opinion under the guise of innocuous content. Their analysis emphasizes the democratic risks associated with the weaponisation of traditional marketing companies for information manipulation purposes. By imitating familiar local media and mixing authentic and deceptive content, these operations can mislead the public, distort political debate, and pollute a country’s information ecosystem, without even the usual safeguards (media literacy, fact-checking, etc.) being able to effectively counteract them.

Finally, in November 2024, a blog post published by Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) provided an overview of the ‘GLASSBRIDGE’ nebula,^(x) combining previous work with their own analyses. According to TAG experts, the various Chinese entities involved (Haixun, Haimai, but also two previously unknown organizations named ‘DURINBRIDGE’ and ‘Shenzhen Bowen Media’) would actually all be linked together, coordinated, and taking instructions from a single decision-maker, whose identity remains unknown at this stage. The report estimates that at least hundreds of fake news sites, in dozens of languages and countries, would thus be centrally controlled to disseminate discourse aligned with Beijing’s interests. The main contribution of the TAG study is thus documenting the relative centralization of this apparently scattered system and its ability to deploy massive and customised influence campaigns depending on target audiences. The progressive unveiling of the GLASSBRIDGE infrastructure by experts since 2022 reveals the existence of an information manipulation ecosystem of unprecedented scope and sophistication. However, despite advances made possible by these works, our understanding of this nebula remains partial. The involvement of multiple private actors in creating inauthentic media websites allows obscuring trails, exploiting vulnerabilities in digital spaces, and reaching varied targets on a large scale, according to a flexible and poorly traceable model that evokes a particularly advanced form of ‘outsourcing’ of Chinese state influence, similar to what the Anxun (I-Soon) leak revealed about cyber operations.^(x) The scope of this network, the similarity of disseminated content despite local adaptations, and the numerous revealed interactions between entities suggest strong capabilities for penetrating foreign audiences. While Google TAG’s assessment points toward a relative centralization of this seemingly dispersed system, our research suggests a more nuanced operational reality within the GLASSBRIDGE ecosystem. Evidence indicates that although strategic coordination may exist at higher levels, implementation frequently exhibits considerable

decentralization. Numerous information operations appear to be executed exclusively by local actors who maintain significant autonomy. This operational flexibility further complicates analysis, as many grey areas persist regarding the identity of the commissioners, the actors involved, the exact distribution of roles, or the degree of coordination of this tentacular system. More broadly, GLASSBRIDGE illustrates the immense challenges posed to democracies by these new disinformation strategies that operate in regulatory blind spots, blur the lines between legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, and rely on the private sector to multiply their impact while staying under the radar. Faced with these diffuse, polymorphous, and poorly traceable threats, it is crucial to continue research efforts to decrypt the workings of these campaigns. This is precisely the ambition of the present study, which intends to make a contribution to understanding this complex ecosystem that we now label “Baybridge”, by articulating three objectives: 1) propose as exhaustive a mapping as possible of the network, completing and coherently assembling elements revealed by previous investigations; 2) present new evidence attesting to Chinese state actors’ involvement in piloting this infrastructure; 3) deeply analyse disseminated content to decrypt deployed discourse strategies and targeting methods. Through these new insights, this work hopes to promote a finer understanding of this phenomenon and lay an additional brick in the still-under-construction edifice of the fight against online information manipulation.

Figure 1

HOW: MAPPING THE NETWORK

INFRASTRUCTURE

This part examines how two digital marketing companies – Shenzhen Haimai Yunxiang Media Co., Ltd. (Haimai) and Shanghai Haixun Technology Co., Ltd (Haixun) – use their infrastructure to target foreign audiences with seemingly tailored messages. By meticulously uncovering the technical, ownership and commercial links in the global network, we observe not only similar ways of working, but also shared pieces of infrastructure and services. At several steps along the customer journey, we find that some common resources are either tied to Haixun -the commercial offers aimed at foreign audiences in particular are hosted by one of its directly owned services-; or to Haimai-, principally some of the content distribution sites (source sites) that feed the end sites are directly or indirectly tied to the company. In addition, we show that although Haimai and Haixun are at the heart of the system, other companies from all over China seem to be using the network’s resources and offerings for their own profit.

MARKETING FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

Traditionally, companies use digital marketing methods for various purposes: Search Engine Optimization, advertisement on social media, and, at times, direct advertising on specific websites (media websites, high-traffic websites, etc.). Digital marketing firms provide their customers with tools and techniques to reach broader audiences and, eventually, increase their market share. This tradecraft can thus be appealing to companies but also to political actors looking to push forward specific messages to target audiences. They might want to boost a candidate or party during an electoral campaign^(x) or, when looking more specifically at international relations, to frame a foreign policy issue to suit their interests.^(x) To do so, they need to rely on intermediaries that can provide them with a solid understanding of the local political dynamics and information ecosystem. This is typically something that the entities identified

in this operation do (see Figure 2).^(x) Haimai, for example, provides the following description of the French media audience: ‘[…] Today, more and more French people want to get the latest developments from all over the world. Therefore, news about the future direction of France has received increasing attention.’^(x) Even though these descriptions tend to overly generalize the dynamics at stake within foreign countries, this shows that there is at least a will to tailor content for specific audiences.

Figure 2 – Haimai details on foreign media ecosystems (Baidu – translated)

THE NETWORK’S ENTITIES

Even though the agenda of a state might differ from that of a company, there can be an overlap in the services both actors seek. The processes and actors involved can thus be quite similar and therefore deserve close examination. When dissecting the processes at stake in the present operation, we identified five main components that subsequently allowed us to establish connections between the multiple legal entities involved:

BUSINESS WEBSITES LEGAL ENTITIES HOSTING SERVICES CONTENT PROVIDERS END WEBSITES Interface with customers Own & operate Store digital brochures Centralize & store content Disseminate content

WEBSITES WEBSITE OF THE WEBSITES HOSTING WEBSITES OF CENTRALISING CONTENT THE CONTENT TO BE ENTITIES MARKETING DESTINATION SHARED PR AGENCIES MATERIAL Ex.: Ex.: Ex.: Ex.: Publicis, Ex.: • publicis.fr afp.fr • Havas, etc. publicis.com • businesswire.com • LeMonde.fr • publicis.dropbox.fr • prfirm.de • publiciswire.fr • monsite.com • • oss.publicis.net

4) Stores messages 2) Acts as the interface 5) Relays the content 3) Centralizes access to (content + translation) to 1) Provides the technical between the PR to reach the target the detailed offers in be pushed to existing + adand human resources agencies and their audiences various formats (xls, pdf) hoc websites customers

Selling influence

Figure 3

Understanding the customer journey, i.e., the steps that an actor must follow to craft and disseminate a message, allows us to precisely map out the role and relative positioning of each entity within this influence operation. 1. The legal entities (PR Agencies), which constitute the cornerstone of the operation at stake, are Chinese firms such as Haixun and Haimai: they are legally registered in China and have, as such, public shareholding and governing structures. They seek to generate revenues through various marketing/communication services. To this end, they operate an infrastructure to disseminate messages with advertising purposes. 2. They each operate multiple business websites, where they display their business proposal; ‘achieve your marketing goals at a fraction of the cost’ (Haixun, on haipress[.]com) and ‘increase the value of your brand’ (Haimai, on hmedium[.]com). Among the multiple business

websites these legal entities operate, some are designed for a Chinese customer base (in Chinese), while others are aimed at an international customer base (in English). 3. On these websites, beyond the business proposal, detailed commercial brochures are made available for customers. These latter can precisely identify the actual capabilities of the agency: where it is able to push content, for which price, for how long, etc. This detailed offer

is not hosted on the business website per se, but on hosting services

(‘external webpages displaying these Excel files or PDF). These external webpages, however, are not separated from the overall infrastructure. 4. Because their end goal is to influence an audience, these firms use content providers to store the content. These multiple websites are presented as a classical newswire service, distributing press releases and advertisements. 5. Finally, to fulfill their business proposal, the legal entities claim to be able to push content to tens of thousands of end websites: pre-existing, official ones (traditional online media, press agencies) but also ad-hoc websites, created in bulk by these entities to host only their customers’ content.

HOW DOES THE INFRASTRUCTURE OPERATE?

The multiple firms constituting the network are intertwined in several ways: technical, legal, and commercial. Most significantly, each identi- fied legal entity shares at least two out of three links type with at least another entity in the network. Even though these entities seem to have distinct governance and capital structures, they do share at least parts of their infrastructure for a common purpose. The most recurrent link is the commercial one: Haimai, Haixun, but also multiple additional digital marketing firms, -including Guangzhou Huya Culture Communication Co., Ltd (广州虎牙文化传播有 限公司) and Guangzhou Yulongwu Cultural Communication Co., Ltd ( 广 州鱼龙舞文化传播有限公司 ). These sometimes offer to promote content on the exact same end websites, sometimes using the same source web- sites. When this is the case, they sell it under the exact same packages names. For example, Haimai and Haixun share 24% of their commercial offers directed at a foreign audience (outside of mainland China). In more concrete terms, one can buy the exact same service – content hosted on website X, then disseminated to websites Y and Z – to multiple Chinese companies.

Figure 4

1. Technical links: shared technical resources

Technical links are all the connections that exist between two or more entities that are directly tied to a physical infrastructure. This typically implies that these entities share a server (a common current or past IP address), or an advertisement ID (AdSense for example). The shared servers can be public – hosting hundreds or thousands of websites that are not related to the entities’ operations; or private – when only websites used in the entities’ operations are hosted on a specific IP address. The list of IP addresses linked to some of the operation’s key domains is available here.

Notably: there have been existing – though inconclusive – infrastructure links between Haimai and Haixun. Sihaimai[.]com, a domain tied to an infrastructure directly providing hosting and dissemination services to Haimai, and haixunpress[.]com, one of Haixun’s main business websites, have shared the IP 47.91.170.222 from January to October 2024. In addition, as displayed in Figure 5, hmedium[.]com (far-left of the graph) is indirectly tied to these entities.

sihaimai.com

hmedium.net From 28/09/2021 to 12/02/2025

From 08/01/2024 to 03/10/2024

haixunpress.co m

Figure 5 – Technical links between some entities

2. Ownership links: beneficiary owner or registrant

Ownership links are the legal connections between a legal entity and one or several cyber entities that it operates (mainly domains and servers): the legal entity directly registered a domain (registrant^(x)) or is mentioned on a website as the legal entity responsible for the content. Indirect ownership links can be established between a legal entity and a domain through specific selectors (contact information, physical addresses, advertisement ID, etc.).

Notably: Hosting websites (such as shiworld[.]cn or mlzgb[.]cn) or content providers (such as ebuypress[.]com, timesnewswire[.]com, or meijiedaka[.]com) allowed us to identify additional interconnections within the network’s entities: Haimai uses content from websites (such as timesnewswire[.]com^(x)) that directly provide content to some of Haixun’s end websites. Additionally, two legal entities (Guangzhou Huya Cultural Communication Co., Ltd and Guangzhou Yulongwu Cultural Communication Co., Ltd.) have also been identified as directly owning websites providing hosting and content to Haimai’s end websites – some of these websites are even hosted on a private server with one of Haimai’s business websites.

Figure 6 – Tadaweb’s Domain investigation results

3. Commercial offer: mutual content/end-websites

When two entities offer the same service – disseminating content from and/or to the exact same websites – they are considered to have commercial ties. Although we could not uncover formal reselling/subcontracting agreements, this constitutes one of the defining characteristics of this infrastructure.

Notably: the offers from Haixun and Haimai are predominantly designed to reach a Chinese audience (the vast majority of more than 20,000 media outlets). The ‘overseas’ offers, designed to reach an international audience, only account for 3% of Haimai’s total number of packages and less than 2% of Haixun’s. Interestingly, however, analysis of the packages’ nomenclature and specifications reveals a 24% overlap of the offerings: Haimai and Haixun provide 104 mutual packages (exact same names and content) to target specific foreign audiences, as shown below (full “overseas” list available here):

These packages contain one or more websites, either third-party or created by the network to disseminate its content. The latter are most likely generated and populated automatically – they sometimes exhibit similar design characteristics and often publish content synchronously.

Jeecg-Boot: an open-source service automating website creation & content dissemination

Screening Haimai’s past digital footprint helped us identify the first website the legal entity registered, globerelease[.]com, displaying quite intriguing generic content distributed on many other companies’ websites.^(x) Beyond content, the architecture of those websites seems to be generated by the same open-source platform, Jeecg-Boot. This low code platform^(x), founded by Zhang Daihao, combines several technologies to generate code quickly and provide off-the-shelf products, such as websites. Using this kind of technology especially illustrates the limited resources invested by Haimai at the very beginning of its activity, when it comes to copywriting and website infrastructure management. Haimai^(x) exploiting this kind of easy-to-use technology demonstrates how effortlessly legal entities can create a myriad of end-websites to bolster specific narratives.

Focus: Expanding the network: which companies resell the packages?

Haimai and Haixun display on their websites a commercial offer to target specific audiences. Multiple filters can be applied to include price, target locations, target news sections/thematic, media type, etc. Once the filters are applied, two types of results are available: single third-party media websites, usually quite well-known (AFP, The Guardian, CCTV, for example), or ‘packages’, containing multiple websites usually centered around a target audience (ex: French people).

Figure 7 – ‘Overseas Media’ offer on haipress[.]com

Each item of the offer (single media website or package) is refe- renced in a database – available here for hmedium[.]net and here for haipress[.]com – and usually detailed either in a table (.xls or QQ sheet) or an external webpage, where all domains included in the package are shown. By examining packages’ hosting and names, we were able to link together multiple entities and enhance our understanding of this political marketing network. In addition to this, by performing reverse searches on the packages’ names in search engines (Google, Yandex, Baidu) and technical search engines (Zoomeye,^(x) Shodan), we have been able to identify dozens of additional business websites and associated legal entities selling the exact same offers as Haimai and Haixun, such as Zhuhai Oudi Technology Co., Ltd. (珠海欧蒂科技有限公 司), Zhengzhou Budao Information Technology Co., Ltd. (郑州布 道信息技术有限公司办理) or Huilingsong Network Technology

Co. Ltd. (成都辉凌网络科技有限公司).^(x) These companies, which often operate multiple business websites pointing towards some of the previously identified infrastructure’s entities, spread across the whole Chinese territory.

WHO IS BEHIND THIS? ATTEMPTING

AN ATTRIBUTION

Having identified similarities in the way Haimai and Haixun disseminate commercial and political content online, this second part examines the structure and goals of these companies. We find consistency in their corporate structure as well as in the concurrent positions held by their key stakeholders. Indeed, at least one core member from each company can be linked to major official CCP propaganda entities, respectively at the Shenzhen municipal level^(x) and at the Guangdong provincial level. Other entities (Guangzhou Yulongwu, Guangzhou Huya and Shenzhen Bowen Media) have not been investigated in as much depth as they appeared less central in Baybridge. It is notable that both executive directors of these marketing-oriented entities, which have been accused of amplifying false narratives, are high-profile researchers in digital technology, and cognitive and social sciences. In the context of the Greater Bay area project, and more generally the CCP’s political agenda to shape its reputation and promote Chinese interests overseas, these businesses potentially serve multiple purposes by facilitating Chinese public authorities’ efforts to disseminate political content.

DEEP DIVE INTO THE HAIMAI NETWORK & STAKEHOLDERS

Uncovering the company structure

Chinese corporate repositories indicate that Shenzhen Haimai Yunxiang Media Co. Ltd. (深圳市海卖云享传媒有限公司 – whose business license is USCC 91440300MA5FWMCHX7) was created in 2019 in the Longhua District of Shenzhen (Guangdong Province) by Wu Yanni (吴燕妮) and Chen Jiang (陈江). Description of its activities includes ‘computer software technology development, technical consulting; business information consulting; electronics technology research and development of business systems’. A commercial portfolio of their advertising services describes Haimai’s activities as ‘social media precision marketing’ (社交媒体精准营销) in the field of Search Engine Optimization (SEO) and Search Engine Marketing (SEM), in addition to operating ‘mainly overseas media releases, foreign media releases, overseas promotion’.^(x) Based on information gathered from Chinese corporate registries, a schematic overview of the corporate structure of Haimai Yunxiang is presented below:

Figure 8 – Haimai Yunxiang Media & Shenzhen Hezhong Tianxia Telecom share-

holding (red arrows)^(x)

Focus: Haimai’s little sister?

Corporate records further reveal that Wu Yanni and Chen Jiang jointly established a second company on March 27, 2024, called Shenzhen Hezhong Tianxia Telecom Co., Ltd. (深圳市合众天 下电讯有限公司 – USCC 91440300MADDYHT41H), under an inverted ownership scheme but with the same amount of capital (RMB 30,000). Except for sharing the same vague activities description as Haimai Yunxiang’s, minimal information can be found about this company on official and corporate registries^(x) one year after its establishment. It is important to note, the company’s registered address is on the 15th floor of Shenzhen’s ‘Armed Police Building’ (or ‘mansion’, 武警大厦). The People’s Armed Police (武 警部队, PAP) is a major Chinese public security force of around

1.5 million personnel, comparable in function to gendarmerie in

France and military police forces worldwide.^(x) Investigation corroborates the building’s existence and its connection with the paramilitary force: photographic evidence documents a prominent PAP metal insignia displayed on the façade above the entrance, accompanied by red flags. Multiple additional indicators, both physical (metal signage) and digital, suggest the facility serves public functions concurrent with PAP operations. The building is also occasionally referenced under the alternative designation

‘Shenzhen Community Grid Management Office’ (深圳市社区网格管理

办公室).

Figure 9 – Entrance of the building^(x)

These pieces of physical evidence of affiliation with the PAP were removed between 2017 and 2022. One hypothesis would indicate that this ‘Armed Police Building’ belonged to the PAP as part of a real estate commodity pool resembling that of the PLA; it could have subsequently lost this status around 2015–2017, consistent with the second divesture plan of the PLA aiming to divert the army from doing business.^(x) Though nomenclature can vary, comparable facilities can be found throughout the country. The hypothesis of joint activities between the People’s Armed Police (or another public security actor) and private companies housed within this building can neither be definitively confir- med nor excluded.

Screening the shareholders: fifty shades of CCP

Of the two stakeholders behind Haimai and Hezhong, our investigation has led us to delve into the profile of Wu Yanni (吴燕妮), born in 1984. She presents a multi-faceted profile alternating between academic, public and corporate involvement.

Academic-public facet

Narrowing down the search to Shenzhen, we have identified the profile of an academic researcher at the Shenzhen Academy of Social Sciences (SZAS), with a PhD in international law from the University of Macau, where she specialized in European Union law and China-EU relations, and was a former postdoctoral fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). As part of her curriculum at Macau University, she also engaged extensively with European academia through a visiting fellowship at the Max Plancq Institute in 2010-2011^(x) and held the Jean

Monnet chair in October 2011.^(x) Wu Yanni is currently serving as director of the Institute of Social Development of the SZAS and has specialized in international law, digital governance and data integration within the Greater Bay Area (粤港澳大湾区).^(x) Her latest publication, ‘Annual report on social governance and development of Shenzhen’, is an official white paper published in October 2024.^(x)

Figure 11 – Wu Yanni’s profile, Institute of Social Development, Shenzhen

Academy of Social Science^(x)

Figure 12 – Wu Yanni participating in a round table at the Jean Monnet chair,

titled ‘Studying the European Union, Studying the European way; in Europe, in China, elsewhere’ on October 28, 2011^(x)

We further discover that, parallel to her academic career, Wu Yanni has been part of the Shenzhen Municipal Party Committee Propaganda Team (市委宣讲团) since at least 2022, after having served as lecturer at the Party School of Longgang District Committee of Shenzhen and been municipal councilor of the Shenzhen municipality.^(x) Along with local CCP officials from various levels with whom she regularly meets, this public position gives her opportunities to interact with companies – for instance by giving a lecture on how ‘Chinese-style modernization comprehensively promotes the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ to a major local fintech group.^(x) Engaging with large and often locally grown Shenzhen companies such as Gaoying International Financial

Technology Group, BYD or T C L Huaxing^(x), could thus serve two motives for the Propaganda Department: first, to lecture them about Party guidelines regarding ideology and business; second, to promote them on the domestic stage and overseas. It is likely that she also leverages these meetings to build business relationships and to network.

Figure 13 – Wu Yanni lecturing companies about business-related

CCP guidelines and policies^(x)

Corporate facet

In addition to this public facet of her career, the same Wu Yanni, member of the SZAS, appears to have quite a significant corporate involvement for a social scientist – described as ‘consultant’ activities in her official biography.^(x) Wu Yanni has indeed obtained a certificate for the ‘Listed Company Independent Director Qualification’ issued by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (N°2,011,627,185) on November 25, 2020. Additionally, she served four years as the ‘independent director’ of

16 ‘高质量发展调研行｜大写的牛！这家万亿市值车企技术鱼池里养着鲸与鲨’ (‘High-quality development research trip | Great! This trillion-dollar auto company has whales and sharks in its technology pond’), Sohu News, June 16, 2022. http://news.sohu.com/a/557796503_121010226

“高质量发展调研行｜吴燕妮：从产品创新到技术创新 直至生态创新” (‘High- quality development research trip | Wu Yanni: From product innovation to technological innovation to ecological innovation’), QQ News, 深圳特区报 （Guangdong Shenzhen Special Zone Newspaper), July 18, 2022. https:// news.qq.com/rain/a/20220718A02M3500?suid=&media_id=

printed-circuit boards company CNC Han’s2021 before her resignation in April 2024.^(x)

Figure 14 – CNC Han’s official document, CITIC Securities, 2021^(x)

We are now certain that the researcher and CCP member Wu Yanni has at least one tangible involvement in corporate activities and an important advocacy role as part of her public activity with SZAS and the Municipal Propaganda Team. At this stage, two profiles for Wu Yanni have been established: on the one hand, Wu Yanni is both a scholar with expertise in data governance and international law, a CCP member and a consultant who serves as

20 “大族数控“ (Han’s CNC), Sina, accessed March 23, 2025. http:// money.finance.sina.com.cn/corp/view/vCI_CorpManagerInfo. php?stockid=301200&Pcode=30736739&Name=%CE%E2%D1%E0%C4%DD. 21 “关于深圳市大族数控科技股份有限公司 首次公开发行股票并在创业板上市申 请文件的 审核问询函之回复报告” (Reply Report on the Review Inquiry Letter on the Application Documents for the Initial Public Offering and Listing on the Growth Enterprise Market of Shenzhen Han’s CNC Technology Co., Ltd.), 深圳 市大族数控科技股份有限公司 (Shenzhen CNC Han’s Technology), September 2021. http://reportdocs.static.szse.cn/UpFiles/rasinfodisc1/202109/ RAS_202109_00017C1177DB273FE41303AFFD6AC23F.pdf

director for a major industrial Shenzhen company. On the other hand, Haimai and Hezhong were created and managed by someone called Wu Yanni too. In parallel, many technology companies related to the same field of activity as Haimai have been registered or managed by a Wu Yanni. This cluster of clues leads us to think both profiles merge into the same person, for two specific reasons: 1. Taking advantage of her own knowledge and strategic position within the public-private ecosystem at SZAS and the Municipal Propaganda Team, Wu Yanni – the CCP member and scholar – has taken part in consulting activities for internationally active businesses from Shenzhen (e.g. CNC Han’s). 2. Since 2021, Wu Yanni – the CCP member and scholar – has also engaged in entrepreneurship by legally representing and/or managing companies whose activities in the field of information technology are directly linked to her Shenzhen Propaganda Team’s activities. Her companies’ infrastructure and activities, such as those of Haimai, could then directly be used for propaganda objectives rather than benign, commercial advertisement or SEO. For further exploration and to substantiate the ‘serial-entrepreneur’ hypothesis, we have listed several business records linked to a ‘Wu Yanni’ (吴燕妮) in the information technology sector, predominantly in Shenzhen.

SHANGHAI HAIXUNSHE: A DEEP-ROOTED AND EFFICIENT BUSINESS

An old and well-established PR network

As previously established, Haimai PR services along with other businesses are being hosted on servers and infrastructure built and registered by Shanghai Haixunshe Technology Co., Ltd. (海讯社文化传播有限公司 – USCC 91310114MA1GYCU293). This limited liability company registered in July 2021 in Shanghai claims to offer all stages of promotional services, from online advertising to broadcasting on billboards domestically and abroad. To understand how Haixun managed to conduct influence operations abroad and gain the trust of institutional actors, it seems de rigueur to retrace the company’s legal and technical roots. The company is owned by Zhu Haisong (朱海松), a prominent Chinese specialist in communication theories, and Shanghai Yihuan Culture Communication (上海易欢文化传播有限公司 – USCC 91310116599763564F). Before Haixun’s registration, Zhu Haisong was

already offering most of Haixun’s current communications services through Shanghai Yihuan, which he registered in April 2012. Its ‘global media resources’ and its dedicated cloud-hosted software were then advertised on easybase[.]cc to provide customers with both an’ intelligent content marketing platform’ automating news release, and a monitoring software to analyze public opinion from print and social media.^(x) It is worth noting that Haixun’s current capabilities also evolved from Zhu Haisong’s former digital achievements over the past fifteen years. In March 2007, he notably established a software company, Shanghai Yiji Network Technology (上海易基网络科技 – USCC 91310116798988045D). The company not only provides corporate clients with web marketing and public relations services, but it also registered and developed websites on behalf of its customers. Today, it is Haixun’s subsidiary, Changzhou Haixunshe Cultural Communication Co (常州海讯社文化传播有限公司 – USCC 91320402MA21MR4B0W) established in June 2020, which seems to be operationally leading Haixun’s software development initiatives. Since 2022, the subsidiary has registered 17 distinct software applications, including the ‘Haixunshe overseas social media resource management’. To automate content dissemination overseas, both in the press and on social media, the subsidiary notably gives access to a paid API: https:// api.haipress.com/api/media/resources.^(x) In April 2024, this subsidiary registered Haixun’s proprietary ‘Media Database’ management system. Given Zhu Haisong’s expertise in digital marketing, his commercial positions in the field since at least 2012, and the extensive network of websites directly or indirectly administered by Haixun, it is highly likely that Haixun’s software for automating content distribution and monitoring press and social media might be commercialized for other PR firms such as Haimai which have similar commercial and political agendas.

Figure 15 – Snapshot of Tadaweb storage capability, enabling users to keep track

of saved web content^(x)

Concurrently with these developments, beginning in April 2024, the company has also promoted in-house AI-driven brand marketing services through aisugao[.]com. This platform employs native LLMs for the automated translation of articles,^(x) with artificial intelligence facilitating both content production and distribution processes.^(x)

Haixun at the service of civil servants

Back in 2013, the Haixun parent company advocated for public authorities to benefit from public relations strategies in the Internet age, as illustrated by the numerous articles on easybase[.]cc’s ’Governments Public Relations’ section.

Figure 16 – Shanghai Yihuan Culture Communication Co., Ltd website,

‘Government Public Relations‘ section, archive^(x)

At the municipal level, Haixun partnered with authorities in Zhonglou District (Changzhou, Jiangsu Province) to implement, in November 2021, the Zhongji “intelligent early warning and ticketing platform, a system designed to track Chinese citizens” movements during the COVID-19 crisis.^(x) Evidence suggests this platform was used by local law enforcement agencies during COVID-19, including the Jiangsu Police (see

Figure 17), as well as other local authorities, following an article from the

China Daily, one of the newspapers owned by the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP.^(x)

Figure 17 – Travel Management Intelligent Early Warning Service Platform’^(x)

Zhu Haisong: the Digital Marketing Guru at the CCP’s service

Figure 18 – Zhu Haisong shares in Haixun parent company & subsidiaries^(x)

‘Methods Are More Important Than Knowledge’

Holding the position of Changzhou Haixunshe Culture Communication Co. CEO on LinkedIn, Zhu Haisong is a renowned figure in Chinese marketing. For at least a decade, this ‘Media expert’ and ‘pioneer of Chinese wireless marketing theory’ has delivered lectures at major social science & business universities across the country. It is worth noting that he has registered more than 15 PR websites during the past fifteen years, in addition to Haixun’s current digital properties.^(x) Zhu Haisong emerges as a successful businessman but also as a prominent academic figure in social sciences and mathematics. Over the past twenty years, he has conducted numerous courses at various universities across the country. As a researcher he also participated in workshops to help public servants better communicate and understand how to influence public opinion, elucidating the concept of ‘fragmented communication’ (碎片化传播).^(x) According to certain academic profiles, Zhu Haisong has given ‘nearly 100 new media keynote speeches to enterprises and government agencies across the country’.^(x) His extensive academic writings primarily focus on virtual networks and cognitive methods pertinent to the era of social media. It is worth noting that any organization with aspirations toward influence could

34 Title of a series of six books partly written by Zhu Haisong, published between 2003 and 2005 and edited by the Guangdong Economic Publishing House. 35 ‘移动互联网时代国际4A广告公司基本操作流程’ (The basic operation process of international 4A advertising companies in the mobile Internet era), Douban, accessed March 25, 2025. https://book.douban.com/subject/26611868/ 36 移动互联网时代国际4A广告公司媒介策划基础 图书 » (Media Planning Basics for International 4A Advertising Companies in the Mobile Internet Era), Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology’s online library, accessed March 25, 2025. https://elib.nuist.edu.cn/space/searchDetailLocal/ me6eab65eadf11740c3a969802ba21211

benefit from such expertise in social media and public opinion. Similar to Wu Yanni, along with his private responsibilities in digital marketing, Zhu Haisong is an active member of research institutes and think tanks. While his business activities are based in Shanghai, his academic and political affiliations are rooted in Guangdong, where he holds the position of Deputy Director of Guangdong Southern Institute of Human Science (广东省南方人事科学研究院). He is introduced as the ‘core member of the commissioned research team of Guangdong Province’s 12th Five-Year Plan and 13th Five-Year Plan’, and a ‘core editorial board member’ of the ten series of books of the ‘Theoretical Guangdong Army’ (理论粤军) 2010 project.^(x) For instance, Zhu Haisong was invited by the Guangdong Provincial Social Organization Federation (广东省社会组织总会) to give a lecture on fragmented internet communication^(x) in April 2018. The Theoretical Guangdong Army’s stated objective is to enhance Guangdong academic research capacity and provide theoretical support to government decision-making, making it an academic hub promoting innovation and social science research. To achieve these ends, it aims to better understand social trends, advocating socialist culture

“碎片化传播：网络舆论背后的传播规律与认知方法”

40 朱海松 (Zhu Haisong), (Fragmented communication: the communication rules and cognitive methods behind online public opinion), 机械工业出版社 (Machinery Industry Press) (2020). 41 南方人事科学研究院 (Southern Institute of Human Resources Science), ‘Warm congratulations to Vice President Zhu Haisong on the release of his new book “A Brief History of Space and Time”’, WeChat, April 08, 2019. https:// mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzIzNzIzMTg3NQ==&mid=2651411615&idx- =1&sn=99c9817b20245ceb046cf963418c7998&chksm=f3363ef3c441b7e5f- 148c617d55f2096de906db0d6365e62706fd3f5521510ed16a1243b1990&scene=27; 北京大学出版社 (Peking University Press), “北大博雅讲坛年度大盘点， 这些精彩不容错“ (Peking University Boya Forum annual review, these highlights are not to be missed), WeChat, December 31, 2023. https:// mp.weixin.qq.com/s?src=11&timestamp=1742990801&ver=5892&sig- nature=8J52LaFql7SxrD7kbuTO7kUoh0w9gR3oY5x5WPoGrD- w8fh0394MchW4yZ FSM1 a V w p 1 X* J n L lt7 FYZC 2 gUp XGb 1 Gx - HxnCRyRuA94ht1LBZVUcDQzi5xa7ofqeHiNc6eM&new=1

and broadening knowledge of the influence of the Internet on academic communication.^(x)

WITNESSING AMBIGUOUS SYNERGIES IN THE DEPTHS OF THE GREATER BAY AREA

Corporate management Ties with the CCP Academic activities Geographical roots & shareholding

• Chinese Academy of • Shenzhen Haimai Social Sciences Yunxiang Media Co., • Jean Monnet chair, Shenzhen Municipal Party Ltd. University of Macau Shenzhen WU Yanni Committee Propaganda • Shenzhen Haimai Macau • Institute of Social Team Information Technology Development of the Co., Ltd. (ceased) Shenzhen Academy of • CNC Han Social Sciences

• Shanghai Haixunshe Technology Co., Ltd. • Shanghai Yihuan Culture Communication Guangdong Southern Co., Ltd. Guangdong Propaganda Shenzhen ZHU Haisong Institute of Human • Changzhou Haixunshe Department Shanghai Science Culture Communication Co., Ltd. • Shenzhen Haimai Information Technology Co., Ltd. (ceased)

Figure 19 – Table illustrating similar activities of Wu Yanni & Zhu Haisong in the

public & private sectors

Stakeholders of both PR companies present striking similarities: Wu Yanni and Zhu Haison both hold an established position in social sciences institutes with direct and indirect links to local Propaganda departments. These converging elements form a coherent profile. While perfect homonymy cannot be definitively ruled out in the Chinese context, the probability of two distinct individuals sharing the same name, geographic location, and complementary domains of expertise appears limited. Moreover, this configuration illustrates a structural characteristic of the contemporary Chinese system, where boundaries between academic, political, and entrepreneurial spheres are deliberately porous, particularly in the strategic domain of information technologies. Both show a common footing in Guangdong province, with respect to their business or academic activities. Having extensively worked on the

challenges and perspectives for the Greater Bay Area and Shenzhen, Wu Yanni calls for more balanced and flexible governance encouraging local business development. In an interview published in February 2025, she openly advocates for Shenzhen’s ‘governance model of “small government, big society” (小政府、大社会) respect[ing] the dominant position of enterprises’. She notably provides insight into the mechanism at work in Shenzhen, explaining that ‘the government sets the stage, enterprises perform, and social organizations come together to promote the innovative development of private enterprises.’^(x) Choosing to establish business activities in the Guangdong province could proceed from the flexible regulatory framework provided by the Greater Bay Area and its major cities, starting with Shenzhen. Since the beginning of modernization reforms, Shenzhen has particularly played a key role in the development of the market economy in China: as the first city designated as a SEZ in 1980, it benefited from successive market-oriented reforms and preferential policies for innovation, in addition to focusing on high-technologies – including information technology. Sometimes dubbed the ‘Chinese Silicon Valley’ (中国硅谷), Shenzhen is therefore at the forefront of the Chinese policies boosting the country’s ICT competitiveness. The municipality notably hosts the country’s major efforts on data centralization and digital governance led by the megapolis’ economy, totaling 11% of China’s total GDP in 2023. From another perspective, Zhu Haisong seems to be at the core of the Guangdong Propaganda Province Committee’s effort to boost the province’s academic activities by opening new social sciences laboratories and trying to establish a ‘Guangdong theoretical army’.^(x) This phenomenon could illustrate the need for the Chinese central state to rely on the local level and on non-governmental stakeholders to support decision-making and implement policies locally; in this case, its big data ambitions in the Greater Bay Area.^(x)

The fact that Wu Yanni and Zhu Haisong are simultaneously members of the CCP, well-known academics and proficient entrepreneurs with strong geographical ties demonstrates synergies where boundaries between political, economic and academic spheres from the same geographical area are increasingly porous.

Figure 20

Indeed, the services developed by Haimai and Haixun tend to demonstrate such synergy. Both galaxies’ end websites effectively serve to spread both commercial and political content, often for Chineserelated matters such as fairs, cryptocurrency firms or industrial companies (e.g. Shenzhen-grown automobile company BYD, or AI-related news in Shenzhen), along with Russian political communiqués (see figure 21 below). While this ‘dual-use’ could increasingly characterise the growing Chinese ‘propaganda-for-hire’ market, the presence of members of the CCP propaganda apparatus at the core of both systems undoubtedly reinforces the ambiguity of its goals. We decided to name this operation ‘Baybridge’ because these intricate activities are rooted in the Greater Bay Area.

2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3814862

Figure 21 – Example of an article focusing on BTS protocols, published from

Shenzhen on euleader.org on May 27th, 2025

WHAT: RUSSIAN AND CHINESE

NARRATIVES WITHIN A SHARED

NETWORK

Having identified at least partially who was behind the infrastructure disseminating content, this third part now examines who the main ‘overseas’ targets of this network are and offers a methodical analysis of the narrative pushed to this audiences. We find that the USA, Asia and Europe are the most exposed to their traditional advertisement but also to their ‘political propaganda’, the latter being mostly disseminated through two intermediary websites. Focusing in particular on the content pushed to a French audience through 12 ad-hoc websites, we show that the network mostly disseminates content aligned with Russian interests, sourcing its narratives to Russian press agencies, propaganda outlets and semi-official Telegram channels. On the other hand, content aligned with Chinese political interest is being disseminated at much lower volumes and in a less hardline way, largely trying to build an information environment fueled by ‘positive energy’. Overall, the quality and reach of the network are currently quite low. However, the involvement of Russian actors and the new risks generated by LLM grooming demand attention.

TARGETS OF THE NETWORK?

A global ambition

We have seen that Haixun and Hamai’s ‘overseas’ commercial offers partially overlap. In total, they offer 871 packages (compiling multiple websites) to customers willing to target foreign audiences in multiple countries. Of these 871 packages, they have 24% in common. From these 871 packages, we have enumerated the target countries, as directly designated on haipress[.]com (Haixun) or mentioned in the packages’ titles/description on hmedium[.]net (Haimai). We have established that the main targets of this network are:^(x)

Percentage (/total number of Region Number of packages packages) Asia 241 28% Europe 193 22% Latin America 92 11% North America 59 7% Africa 48 6% MENA 20 2%

Several things stand out: • The United States of America is the single most targeted country – it accounts for 6% of the total number of packages. • From a geographical distribution perspective, China’s near abroad is the main target from this network: South Korea, India, Vietnam, Thailand, Japan and Taiwan are a clear priority. • Europe is the second main target of this network, in particular these countries: the United Kingdom (21 packages targeting the country), Spain (20), Italy (18), Portugal (17), France (15) and Germany (15).

Figure 22 – Number of packages targeting specific European countries

Where does the propaganda flow?

Once the high-level targets of the network (i.e. the countries for which one can buy a designated package comprising one or multiple websites) have been established, the objective will be to focus on one specific aspect of this network: propaganda. Indeed, this digital infrastructure that can be used for marketing purposes – as shown before – is also used to disseminate politically biased content. This can be done technically on most of the websites listed in the packages, but some seem to be fully designated for this purpose. Several packages are indeed explicitly labeled as serving ‘Political Propaganda’ (政宣题材) purposes. They are all hosted by Haimai^(x):

Chinese package name English translation Japan [Japanese] Political Propaganda 日本 [日语] --政宣题材 Korea [Korean] Political Propaganda 韩国 [韩语] --政宣题材 France [French] Political Propaganda 法国 [法语] --政宣题材 UK [English] Political Propaganda 英国 [英语] --政宣题材 Italy Political Propaganda 意大利 [意语] --政宣题材 Russia [Russian] Political Propaganda 俄罗斯 [俄语] --政宣题材 Germany [German] Political Propaganda 德国 [德语] --政宣题材 Spain [Spanish] Political Propaganda 西班牙 [西语] --政宣题材 Poland [Polish] Political Propaganda 波兰 [波兰语] --政宣题材 Netherlands [Dutch] Political Propaganda 荷兰 [荷兰语] --政宣题材 Romania [Romanian] Political Propaganda 罗马尼亚 [罗马尼亚语] --政宣题材 All-European Selection [Multi-language] Political 全欧洲精选 [多语言] --政宣题材 Propaganda Global Core Political Propaganda [English] Political 全球核心政宣 [英语] --政宣题材 Propaganda

NB: These packages are offered only by Haimai. This report does not focus on the content disseminated by Haixun. It is, however, worth noting that Haixun specifically built websites designated to manipulate foreign audiences. For more on this, Mandiant’s report^(x) or the 3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information

Manipulation and Interference Threats give specific examples as well as a deeper

content analysis.^(x)

Within these packages, the websites all share similar features: 1. Most of these websites adopt a misleading naming convention, either to impersonate already established and trusted websites^(x) or to present themselves as genuine news outlets. The following examples illustrate this pattern – all Haimai domains are available here, and all “overseas” domains here: • louispress[.]org – Louis Press – FRANCE (FR) • friendlyparis[.]com – Paris Amical – FRANCE (FR) • findmoscow[.]com – Найти Москву – RUSSIA (RU) • euleader[.]org – EU Leader – EU (EN) • capitalsydney[.]com – Sydney News – AUSTRALIA (EN)

2. The websites are hosted in clusters that are organized – albeit par- tially – according to their target audience: websites targeting Russia are hosted on the same server, those targeting France as well, etc.

August 4, 2022. https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ pro-prc-information-operations-campaign-haienergy?hl=en

Figure 23 – Websites targeting respectively a Russian and French audience

often share a common IP address^(x)

3. They disseminate substantively homogeneous content, in languages generally tailored to the target audience. While certain elements of the content appear adapted to specific audiences, the majority remain standardized across platforms. The material predominantly comprises political news narratives, interspersed with commercial press releases and advertisements (Figure 24).

Figure 24 – Screenshots from the home pages of Eiffel Post, EU Leader and Kazan

Culture (25/03/2025)

4. They display very low quality standards. Whatever the target audi-

ence language, we noticed a large amount of spelling and grammar mistakes. Some pictures were also frequently missing (Figure 25).

Figure 25 – Screenshots from the homepages of two websites on July 8, 2025.

1) friendlyparis[.]com with spelling mistakes and missing pictures; 2) londonclup[.] com with content in Vietnamese

A single source of truth

As previously demonstrated, France is among the main targets of this network. Our analysis has established that Haimai purports to disseminate content specifically calibrated for a French audience, implementing this strategy through several packages, including its ‘Propaganda’

package. This distribution mechanism encompasses the following twelve websites: • alpsbiz[.]com • rmtcityfr[.]com • provencedaily[.]com • louispress[.]org • friendlyparis[.]com • eiffelpost[.]com • fr.wdpp[.]org • fr.euleader[.]org • fftribune[.]com • economyfr[.]com • froneplus[.]com • frnewsfeed[.]com In order to understand what kind of content was pushed on these 12 websites, we collected the last 1,000 articles published on each of these and identified the source

Figure 26 – Content from these websites retrieved through Tadaweb’s monitoring

capabilities, with a source website framed in red

On these 12 websites, we found that the following source websites were used:^(x) • updatenews[.]info: in total, 77% of the last 1,000 articles posted by each website originated from this website • timesnewswire[.]com: in total, 13% of the last 1,000 articles posted by each website originited from this website It is worth noting that updatenews[.]info is also redistributing content from Times News Wire^(x), which means that the total content originating from timesnewswire[.]com is higher than these figures indicate. Other source websites have been identified but represent less than 0.5% of the content distributed to these 12 websites. It is worth pointing out that among these source websites, news.cgtn[.]com appears several times (though it accounts for less than 0.1% of the total).

A closed-loop system

Whether the target audience has effectively been reached seems unlikely. The network probably operates a closed-loop system. Several articles promoting events, brands or political statements are published daily on multiple websites, but these are generally built and operated by Haimai or Haixun. None of the companies provide concrete examples of how they promote content on third-party websites such as AFP or Associated Press (which are nonetheless part of their offer). A striking example is an article^(x) published on several Chinese online newspapers, Sohu and WeChat public accounts in early December 2022. It highlighted the distribution of news articles celebrating Jinan commercial port by so-called ‘overseas’ media. The article, titled ‘Strong “out of the circle”! 26. British and French media focused on Jinan City Central District’(‘强势“出圈”！26家英法媒体重磅聚焦济南市中区”) shared several screenshots of Haimai websites from their French and British ‘Political Propaganda’ package as evidence of Chinese cultural

influence abroad: ‘Recently, more than 20 authoritative British and French media, including the world-renowned news distribution agency Time, World Development News UK, EU Leaders UK, Victoria News Agency, the old French news agency Louis News Agency, well-known French fashion media France Fashion Forum, Paris portal – Amity Paris, Britannia Future, etc., focused on reporting on Jinan City Center, and simultaneously published pictures and texts […] covering a large number of overseas audiences.’ Not only are none of these media ‘authoritative’, but they are also all part of the ‘Political Propaganda’ packages sold by Haimai.

Figure 27 Screenshots from the advertisement article promoted on multiple media

created by the network

In addition, these websites appear to generate minimal online traction: SimilarWeb, a platform that analyses website performance and tracks millions of websites, does not provide any data on the 12 websites in the French ‘Political Propaganda’ package. Similarly, when we examine the reach of this network on social media, we see that very few publications reference the aforementioned websites. Most of the accounts reposting these contents are the companies mentioned in the articles or sometimes individuals with few followers. We did not detect any entity successfully promoting articles from the French ‘Political Propaganda’ package on major social media platforms, including Weibo and VKontakte. As far as we can tell, neither the will nor the skill currently exists to carry out complex influence operations on social media.

THE CHINESE NARRATIVE: POSITIVE ENERGY

To understand exactly the nature of the content disseminated – but largely not relayed – by both updatenews[.]info and timesnewswire[.]com, we conducted a systematic analysis of mentioned entities, thematic patterns, and information sources to identify the underlying narrative frameworks structuring articles across this network. Our quantitative analysis deliberately maintained no distinction between purely ‘marketing’ content (the network’s official value proposition) and ‘propaganda’ material. However, when examining specific pieces disseminated by Baybridge more closely, we focused on materials explicitly aligned with Chinese or Russian political interests.

Times News Wire: spreading the good word

We first focused on Times News Wire, as it is not only directly feeding the whole propaganda network, but also partially updatenews[.]info, as explained. We extracted 1,000 articles (between November 19th, 2024, and March 27th, 2025) and saw that among the most quoted entities were predominantly China and the United States, as well as Europe. This only tells us that these areas are largely discussed in the content disseminated by this website.

Figure 28 – Extract from timesnewswire[.]com – 1,000 articles published between

November 19th, 2024 and March 27th, 2025 (entity extraction based on the content of these articles, using Spacy3.8.4 en_core_trf model)

When looking at the content in greater detail, most of the articles are, unsurprisingly, press releases. But something stands out: among the press releases, propaganda articles appear, usually republishing content from either CGTN or the Global Times, both state-driven media known to disseminate the CCP’s official line. These account for less than 5% of the total number of articles distributed by Times News Wire, but they are reproduced on most of the end websites, usually on the same day. It is worth noting that these articles, however, are always in English – regardless of the target audience’s language.

Figure 29 – Left: latest CGTN articles displayed on timesnewswire[.]com; Right: latest

CGTN articles displayed on eiffelpost[.]com

In-depth analysis of this corpus reveals an infrastructure operating according to two distinct yet intertwined registers. The first, quantitatively dominant, consists of pure commercial marketing: blockchain company press releases, technological innovation announcements, Sinointernational industrial partnerships. The deployed vocabulary – “innovation,” “transformation,” “leadership,” “efficiency” – constitutes the lexical pivots of this register, appearing respectively in 68%, 54%, 47%, and 41% of analyzed commercial articles. These fall into highly predictable patterns: “blockchain” systematically appears with “revolutionary” (73% of cases), “technology” with “future” (69%), forming associative chains characteristic of contemporary advertising discourse.

Figure 30Figure 31Figure 32

The second register, minoritarian but structurally significant, concerns political content from Chinese state media. These articles present specific discourse characteristics: near-absence of epistemic modalization, predominance of assertive mode, systematic association between Chinese entities and meliorative attributes. Analysis reveals that uncertainty markers (“might,” “seems,” “perhaps”) appear three times less frequently than in a comparable journalistic corpus. This enunciative certainty transforms projections into realities, ambitions into accomplishments. The coexistence of these two registers is not fortuitous. It reveals a dual exploitation logic of the infrastructure: profitable commercial distribution on the one hand, occasional insertion of political content on the other. This hybridization suggests an economic model where advertising revenues finance a latent political dissemination capacity. The linguistic uniformity of political content – never translated nor culturally adapted – nevertheless betrays an operation prioritizing quantitative metrics (number of published articles, sites reached) over real communicational impact. More revealing still, co-occurrence analysis in both registers reveals a common discourse matrix: that of systematic positivity. Whether promoting a cryptocurrency or presenting a Chinese political initiative, the corpus manifests a uniformly optimistic tone. The recurring formulas

– “secure, efficient, and transparent” (73% of blockchain articles), “winwin cooperation” (81% of articles on Sino-foreign partnerships), “sustainable development” (67% of environmental articles) – constitute less arguments than incantations. This rhetoric of obligatory optimism, which evacuates all critical or interrogative nuance, points toward a structuring conceptual framework: the paradigm of “positive energy” (正能量), one of the cornerstones of contemporary Chinese political communication.

The ‘Positive Energy’ Paradigm: From Domestic Governance Tool to Failed Export Strategy

The systematic patterns identified in our lexicometric analysis point toward an underlying conceptual architecture. These quantitative regularities are not random but reflect the operational influence of a specific ideological framework. This uniformity of discourse structures identified in our quantitative analysis gains clarity when examining the conceptual matrices governing this content production. Beyond the lexical regularities and recurring semantic associations, the corpus’s narrative architecture reveals the imprint of a central organizing principle: the concept of ‘positive energy’. This notion, which implicitly structures the lexical choices and thematic framings observed above, warrants deeper examination to understand how communication paradigms developed for the Chinese domestic context are transposed into international influence operations.

Origins: From Popular Culture to Political Lexicon

The expression ‘zheng nengliang,’ literally translated as ‘positive energy,’ first emerged in China during the early 2000s but achieved widespread cultural resonance in 2012. This surge in popularity coincided with two events: the London Olympics and the Chinese translation of Richard Wiseman’s book Rip It Up, retitled Positive Energy for the Chinese market. The concept gained traction partly because it aligned with traditional Chinese philosophical notions of ‘positive qi’ (气), reflecting cultural continuity within linguistic innovation. China’s National Research and Observatory Center for Linguistic Resources designated it as the ‘word of the year.’^(x)

According to the China Media Project (CMP) Dictionary, this expression – initially a popular cultural phenomenon – transformed as it was incorporated into official discourse when Xi Jinping assumed Communist Party leadership.^(x) This transition marked the beginning of a deliberate appropriation process, whereby an organically developed cultural term was systematically integrated into the political lexicon of the Chinese state.

Official Appropriation

Following its emergence in mainstream culture, the ‘positive energy’ concept underwent strategic adoption across various official contexts. This appropriation transformed it from a popular expression into an instrument for nation-building, reframed as ‘Chinese culture positive energy.’ The formal integration into official discourse coincided precisely with Xi Jinping’s ascension to power in late 2012. While the term appeared in various contexts, it acquired greater political significance during the Central Forum on Arts and Literature in October 2013. At this gathering, Xi Jinping explicitly endorsed the concept, instructing artists that their works ‘should be like sunshine, blue sky and the spring breeze, inspiring minds, warming hearts and cultivating taste.’ He emphasized that cultural production should fundamentally embody ‘positive energy.’^(x) In media governance, the concept functions as an extension of previous official communication strategies implemented under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, which similarly emphasized favourable coverage. It operates in close association with the principle of ‘guidance of public opinion’ (舆论引导)—a foundational element of the Chinese Communist Party’s media control architecture since 1989.^(x) This continuity with established media control mechanisms demonstrates that adopting ‘positive energy’ represents an evolution rather than a revolution in information management strategy, while benefiting from broader cultural legitimacy. A concrete illustration of this operational framework emerged when Hanzhong city’s propaganda director addressed a forum commemorating China’s Journalists’ Day in 2014. He explicitly connected ‘positive energy’ with ‘guidance,’ directing media

practitioners to shape public opinion while disseminating positive energy throughout society.^(x)

Multiple Dimensions of Positive Energy and Its Effectiveness Mechanisms

Yang and Tang identify this concept’s effectiveness through its capacity to create false equivalences—personal happiness becomes indistinguishable from political loyalty, individual success merges with national prosperity. This semantic conflation neutralizes potential dissent by making criticism of the state appear as criticism of optimism itself.^(x) This discourse strategy blurs lines between self-confidence and faith in the regime, reducing potential antagonism between citizens and political power. The concept remains closely associated with media and ideological controls and frequently appears alongside directives for ‘correct guidance’ in official communications. The concept has extended to international affairs and broader propaganda efforts. A People’s Daily article from February 2021 stressed the need to ‘sing the main theme, and strengthen positive energy’, connecting traditional propaganda approaches with this newer concept.^(x) In the lead-up to the CCP’s 100th anniversary in 2021, official communications emphasized how cultural artifacts could ‘invigorate positive energy for development’,^(x) demonstrating the concept flexibility in supporting various propaganda objectives.

The Export of the Concept in International Influence Campaigns

Given this demonstrated effectiveness within China’s domestic information ecosystem, the attempted deployment of the ‘positive energy’ paradigm in international influence operations appears as a logical extension of established practice. The Baybridge network’s operational documents reveal precisely such an attempt. Mandiant’s report highlights that a spreadsheet hosted on Haixun’s servers, labeled as part of their ‘Positive Energy’ package, contained a distribution list for content

delivery to various international platforms.^(x) This instrumentalization of the concept in international influence operations demonstrates how notions initially developed for internal governance can serve China’s geopolitical interests in the global information space. The export of the ‘positive energy’ concept should, to be fully effective, entail a semantic reconfiguration adapted to non-Chinese audiences. While in the domestic context the notion draws upon established cultural resonances (traditional medicine, Taoist conceptions of qi, the dialectic of social harmony), its international deployment indeed requires translation that transcends the linguistic to encompass the conceptual. However, content disseminated by HaiEnergy does not demonstrate genuine adaptation to Western interpretive frameworks—a characteristic relatively common in Chinese informational content. This direct application of domestic conceptual frameworks to international audiences reflects a significant limitation in China’s external communication strategy. The unmodified transposition of concepts like ‘positive energy’ illustrates how communication strategies developed for controlled domestic information ecosystems often prove less effective in foreign environments. This practice highlights a fundamental challenge in transnational influence operations that Bourdieu’s analysis of the international circulation of ideas helps illuminate^(x): texts and concepts travel without their original context of production and reception, creating what he termed ‘structural misunderstandings’ despite increasing global interconnectedness, the cultural embeddedness of meaning continues to constrain cross-cultural transfer of politically charged concepts. Analysis of the Baybridge campaign reveals that the guiding principle of ‘positive energy’ functions more as an implicit modus operandi than as a deliberately exported lexical element. The international circulation of this communicational paradigm operates according to three principal modalities: • Structural transposition: Chinese narrative matrices privileging harmony and positivity are reproduced in content intended for international audiences, independent of explicit utilization of the term ‘positive energy’.

• Axiological impregnation: the underlying values of the concept (optimism, harmony, constructivism) are integrated into discourse strategies deployed by Chinese influence actors. • Methodological prescription: the concept functions as an operational directive guiding the selection and framing of disseminated content.

Resistances and Criticisms

Despite the effectiveness of official adoption of ‘positive energy’, its repeated use in official discourse has generated resistance among segments of the Chinese population. This rejection has manifested in expressions like ‘poisoned chicken soup’ (毒鸡汤), referring to the illusion of impossible happiness, particularly among younger generations.^(x) This resistance demonstrates the limits of official appropriation and the ability of Chinese citizens to develop counter-discourses challenging overly simplistic positive messaging. It remains, at this juncture, methodologically challenging to quantify the effects of these counter-discourses on the construction of propagandistic content intended for foreign audiences.

From conceptual framework to operational contradictions

While positive energy provides a theoretical framework for Chinese influence operations, examination of the network’s actual output reveals a fundamental divergence between design and implementation. The infrastructure built to propagate positive energy narratives – emphasizing harmony and constructive development – has been appropriated by actors pursuing contradictory agendas. This operational reality – where Russian confrontational narratives overwhelm Chinese harmonious messaging within the same infrastructure—exemplifies the broader dysfunction of the Baybridge network: a system designed for ‘positive energy’ that instead amplifies contradictory and often hostile content.

THE RUSSIAN NARRATIVE: AN ANTAGONISM DISPENSER

A well-known polarization strategy

Though the propaganda disseminated through Times News Wire aims to promote a Chinese narrative emphasizing positive energy, we observed that the end-websites were mostly flooded with articles advancing the Russian view on current events.

Figure 33 – provencedaily[.]com homepage from April 3, 2025 displaying articles

pushing the Kremlin’s narrative and Russia-specific news

When looking more precisely at these seemingly pro-Russia articles, it appears they all come from updatenews[.]info and are (poorly) translated for the target audiences’ language. As demonstrated above, Update News is the main content provider for all the end websites in the ‘propaganda’ packages. This automatic replication reminds us of previous Russian disinformation operations, such as RRN-Doppleganger, where this modus operandi was already observed.^(x) It is also worth noting that multiple websites from the propaganda packages, as well as updatenews[.]info, were temporarily hosted on a Russian server with the IP

address 185.158.115.149.^(x) None of these sites were originally hosted on this server, nor are they still hosted on it. Applying a similar method as before, we extracted 1,000 articles published on this website from February 17th to March 27th to analyse the main topics it covered. What stands out is the fact that updatenews[.] info mostly published (and redistributed) political content, with a strong focus on topics aligned with the Russian state’s interests. Figure 34 shows that the main entities mentioned across the articles collected are the United States, Russia and Ukraine. In addition, directly subordinate entities (Trump, Putin, Zelensky, Washington, Moscow) are among the most frequently occurring. These entities are almost always mentioned in relation to Russia and its current invasion of Ukraine, or from a Russian perspective.

Figure 34 – Extract from updatenews[.]info – 1,000 articles published between

February 17th and March 27th, 2025 (entity extraction based on the content of these articles, using Spacy3.8.4 en_core_trf model)^(x)

Focusing on France, this analysis is reinforced as most news about the country is linked to the war in Ukraine. There are multiple biases in the way information is presented, as pro-Kremlin voices are amplified, and narratives from hardliners (such as Tsargrad) are pushed. The main narrative pushed forward aims to undermine the Ukrainian government and insists on the legitimacy of the Russian ‘special operation’. When not focused on the war in Ukraine, articles touch upon divisive political and social issues. One striking example of this network’s influence agenda is the over-representation of French ‘sovereignist’ politician and leader of the French Patriotic Party Florian Philippot. He is also the former advisor to Marine Le Pen, the head of the French Rassemblement National. Though he has not held any electoral mandate since 2022 and his list obtained less than 1% in the 2024 European elections, his opinion on the French situation, or world affairs is often singled out and sometimes even presented as ‘the’ French view on some events. It is coherent with the fact that he has been identified by the Russian influence organization, the Social Design Agency, as a pro-Russian opinion leader in the country.^(x) Under the title ‘In France, they call NATO a sect of globalists and demand that they withdraw’, the article says: ‘NATO is a globalist sect. In an article from April 2025, Florian Philippot reacts to the appointment of former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte as the new Secretary General of the North Atlantic Alliance by declaring: “NATO is a globalist sect”.^(x) This amplification strategy is very similar to the one implemented by the Portal Kombat network,^(x) through its ‘Pravda’ websites.^(x) Some examples of very similar content pushed across both networks can be found: on January 5, 2025, updatenews[.]info published an article quoting Mr. Philippot saying ‘[…] It is very possible that this will cause hysteria in

the EU, but fortunately they have no chance of paying the federal government of. Ukraine and arming it [sic]’;^(x) on January 6, 2025, france. news-pravda[.]com used almost the same quote: ‘It is quite possible that this will cause hysteria among the EU, but it fortunately does not have the capacity to endlessly pay for Ukraine and arm it.’^(x)

Unsurprising content sources

Updatenews[.]info does not seem to be generating its own content. On the contrary, all the articles we examined could be traced back to multiple external sources: news agencies, third-party media or Telegram channels, for example. With the exception of some advertising content pushed through the TimesNewsWire category, here are the most recurrent domain redirections found in the content of the articles (based on 5,000 articles published between October 19, 2024 and April 15, 2025):

Link Count russian.rt.com 200 ria.ru 188 vm.ru 151 tass.ru 118 rg.ru 114 www.championat.com 95 vz.ru 94 www.timesnewswire.com 47 www.m24.ru 43 www.passion.ru 29 finance.rambler.ru 29 ru.riotpixels.com 24 www.ferra.ru 23 runews24.ru 22 news.cgtn.com 20 www.pnp.ru 18 www.mk.ru 18 t.me/MariaVladimirovnaZakharova 18

Standing out as very recurrent sources, we find two official Russian press agencies, TASS and RIA Novosti.^(x) Their role in Russian influence operations is well documented.^(x) Beyond the redirections shown below, they are among the 50 most quoted entities within the content of updatenews[.]info (articles gathered between February 17th and March 27th, 2025). This is still an understatement of their actual influence, though, as these sources are not always directly mentioned in the articles. In such cases, the content can however be traced back to them by translating the English text from updatenews[.]com into Russian and searching for the exact excerpts in Yandex, the main Russian search engine. In most cases, the content is not a direct copy from the text of this agency, but from third-parties partly rewriting content. The main go-to source for this seems to be Rambler[.]ru, one of the main news aggregators in Russia.

Figure 35 – Content from Rambler[.]ru copied and translated to updatenews[.]info,

including an insert pointing towards another article

In addition, the network also relays some hard-line Russian propaganda news outlets and channels. For example, Tsargrad TV, a hawkish, ultraconservative and pro-Kremlin news outlet related to traditionalist businessman Konstanin Malofeev and feeding multiple influence networks directly connected to the FSB, is quoted in multiple articles.^(x) It is known for its strong anti-Western and Ukraine stance.^(x) Similarly, RT, the Russian state transnational network under Western sanctions, is also

a frequently used source – several articles include links to RT articles. Multiple Telegram channels are also used within the articles, with direct redirection links. Among these, pro-Kremlin bloggers but also officials such as Maria Zakharova (the spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) or Alexey Pushkov (Russian Senator and chairman of the Commission on Information Policy). Official entities are also used as a source, not only through their Telegram publication but also by directly referring to their websites: svr.gov[.]ru, duma.gov[.]ru and several others have been identified. Whether in terms of narrative or source typology, this ecosystem is very similar to that of Portal Kombat (or Pravda), as described by Viginum, France’s service for vigilance and protection against foreign digital interference.^(x) Indeed, part of Portal Kombat’s playbook is the dissemination and translation of content from Russian news agencies, Telegram channels and official websites to websites tailored to reach specific audiences on a language/nationality basis. Though we cannot formally tie these two campaigns, as neither technical links nor deeper attribution can be made, we believe it is worth pointing out these similarities. This diversification – the Russian influence campaign plugging itself into the Chinese-made infrastructure^(x) – could be traced back to March 9th, 2024, when the latest occurrences of news posted outside of the ‘TimesNewsWire’ category were found. It should however be noted that content from categories outside of TimesNewsWire could be deleted, at a pace we were unable to determined.^(x)

see ‘Наши Герои.’ Царьград, accessed April 15, 2025. https://by.tsargrad.tv/ ourheroes. 34 For example, ‘Pushkov: The Result of the Lawsuit Against Le Pen Became the Indignation of the French and the Support of Trump. ’ Update News, accessed April 15, 2025. https://www.updatenews.info/pushkov-the-result-of-the-lawsuit- against-le-pen-became-the-indignation-of-the-french-and-the-support-of-trump/.

Figure 36 – Publications per category from August 2020 (first article posted on the

website) to April 2025

A poor attempt at shaping opinions

The articles are most likely automatically published and not reviewed, as multiple errors can be found. A striking one, that negatively impacts the quality of the whole operation, is that the overall level of the translation is poor, leading to sentences that are sometimes hard to understand, such as: ‘The United States threatens the tasks up to 245% for imports from China’, ‘It is known for the incompatibility of the train stations and Starship gateway’,^(x) etc. This might be due do automatic translation from Cyrillic to English, without the involvement of native speakers. It is worth noting that despite this poor result, both Haimai and Haixun offer these translation services for an additional price. Another issue that further points to gross automation is that the content posted on updatenews[.]info contains text that should not appear if proper text curation had been performed. For example, inserts aiming to redirect readers to other articles on news.rambler[.]ru are often included in the content of articles translated and published on updatenews[.]info. (see Figure 37). Beyond this issue with the initial copy/scraping of data by the Baybridge network, additional problems regarding transliteration were

Accessed April 17, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20200803114531/ http://www.updatenews.info/.

identified. Between October 16, 2024 and February 18, 2025 – no occurrences were found after this date –, we encountered multiple articles with quotes that showed unintelligible content (see Figure 37). This was likely due to an error in encoding Cyrillic when translated into English, as most articles were originally written in Russian before being translated and posted to updatenews[.]info. By analyzing various samples, we were able to map the mis-encoded ‘alphabet’ to translate these quotes.^(x) The fact that these suddenly appeared and then disappeared, coupled with the problems mentioned above, suggests an automated operation with minimal human involvement.

Figure 37 – Failed automated posting from TASS to updatenews[.]info

One hypothesis for the lack of attention paid to the content pushed on updatenews[.]info and distributed on the end websites is that this content is not primarily intended to be read on these websites. Indeed, as already shown by the DFR Lab and CheckNews, as well as by NewsGuard, pro-Russian infrastructure can be used to intoxicate LLMs.^(x) This ensures several advantages, the first one being the ability to reach

very large audiences through LLMs used as ‘megaphones’.^(x) Another one is the circumvention of sanctions: by acting as ‘a laundering machine for Kremlin propaganda’,^(x) the articles relaying sanctioned media such as RT or Sputnik can still reach a European audience. We did not find any direct evidence that updatenews[.]info had been assimilated by the most widely used generative AI agents,^(x) as this source is not known or deemed credible by most AI agents. However, given the wide network of end-websites operated by the Chinese-built network and the efforts they put into SEO, we cannot exclude that these models might pick up on some of the network’s narrative.

Focus: Xi Jinping visit to France

In early May 2024, the Chinese president made an official visit to France. From May 5 to May 7, Emmanuel Macron and Xi Jinping covered various topics, including the war in Ukraine. On May 6th, CGTN issued an article^(x) insisting on the symbiotic ties between France and China, quoting the Chinese president who praised the ‘[…] mutual understanding, strategic vision and winwin cooperation.’ This article was later published on timesnewswire[.]com^(x) and updatenews[.]info,^(x) then on end-websites such as provencedaily[.]com. The following day, on May 7th, another article^(x) was published on updatenews[.]info with a contradictory message: titled ‘France accused Xi Jinping of humiliating Macron’, it once again equated Mr Philippot and the official position of the French state, as he was the one characterising this ‘humiliation’. This article was originally published on RIA Novosti,^(x) then (poorly) translated and pushed to updatenews[.]info and finally disseminated to end-websites, such as euleader[.]org.

Figure 38 – Two articles mentioning Xi Jinping’s visit

to France on updatenews[.]info

What we therefore notice is two dissonant narratives being pushed on the same website in two days, then disseminated to similar end websites. The harsh Russian narrative is directly contradicted by the Chinese stance, aiming to promote ‘positive energy’aligned content. This lack of coordination may indicate that pro-Russian and pro-Chinese actors are interested in using this infrastructure to promote their own visions of the world, without realising the strategic absurdity of doing so.

CONCLUSION

The in-depth analysis of the BAYBRIDGE network reveals a paradox: while the deployed technical infrastructure demonstrates considerable ambition and substantial investments, the operational effectiveness of the system remains remarkably limited. This study has brought to light several structural dysfunctions that call into question the very nature of these influence operations. The detailed mapping of the network has revealed a complex architecture articulating legal entities, technical infrastructures, and shared commercial offerings. The identified links between Haimai and Haixun testify to an ecosystem whose technical sophistication contrasts with the mediocrity of the content produced. The analysis of the corpus revealed rudimentary discourse strategies. More troubling still, the observation of ‘uncoordinated inauthentic behavior’ within the network reveals an opportunistic appropriation of the infrastructure by actors pursuing contradictory agendas. The coexistence of pro-Chinese and pro-Russian narratives on the same platforms, sometimes in direct opposition such as during Xi Jinping’s visit to France, illustrates, at least in that case, the absence of central strategic coordination. This informational cacophony compromises the persuasive effectiveness of the system. Faced with these findings, three main hypotheses illuminate the causes of this manifest ineffectiveness.

FIRST HYPOTHESIS: INSUFFICIENT COMPETENCE

The first explanation, the most immediate, attributes the observed failures to a lack of professional skills. Several indicators converge in this direction: the poor quality of automatic translations, the absence of editorial curation, recurring technical errors in Cyrillic character encoding, and the mechanical reproduction of parasitic elements in content (advertising insertions, irrelevant internal links). These failures suggest crude automation devoid of qualified human supervision. This hypothesis finds resonance in the decentralized character of the operations. The identified actors – Wu Yanni in Shenzhen, Zhu Haisong in Shanghai – appear more as opportunistic local entrepreneurs than as seasoned professionals in information warfare. Their respective expertise in social sciences and digital marketing, while substantial

in their domains, by no means guarantees mastery of the subtleties of cross-cultural influence. The apparent absence of involvement by genuine disinformation specialists could explain the amateurish character of numerous aspects of the operation.

SECOND HYPOTHESIS: BUREAUCRATIC LOGIC AND ITS DEVIATIONS

The second hypothesis, more structural and in our view more convincing, locates the ineffectiveness of the system within the very mechanisms of the contemporary Chinese bureaucratic system. This interpretation aligns with classical analyses of bureaucratic dysfunctions, from Weber to Crozier^(x), transposed to the specific context of Chinese governance. The cadre evaluation system in China notoriously privileges quantitative indicators over qualitative results^(x). In this context, the multiplication of websites, the volume of published articles, the number of commercialized ‘packages’ constitute so many easily quantifiable metrics that demonstrate sustained activity, independent of any real impact on targeted audiences. This logic of numbers, characteristic of the ‘bureaucratic formalism’ (形式主义) regularly denounced by Chinese authorities themselves, finds here a paradigmatic illustration. More concerning, the positions occupied by the principal actors within the local political-economic ecosystem suggest mechanisms of public rent capture. Wu Yanni, member of the Shenzhen municipal propaganda team while directing Haimai, finds herself in a privileged position to direct public contracts toward her own enterprises. This configuration evokes the phenomena of ‘crony capitalism^(x), analyzed in the literature on post-socialist transitions, where proximity to political power becomes the principal source of competitive advantage. The ineffectiveness of the system could thus paradoxically constitute its raison d’être: in a logic of bureaucratic diversion, the objective is not so much to convince foreign audiences to justify financial flows and satisfy administrative performance indicators. As public commissioners,

lacking the technical skill to evaluate the real effectiveness of campaigns, they content themselves with superficial metrics (number of publications, theoretical geographic coverage, displayed linguistic diversity) without measuring the actual impact on public perceptions. This hypothesis is consistent with the observation of ‘ambiguous synergies’ within the Greater Bay Area, where boundaries between public and private interests blur. The model of ‘small government, big society’ advocated by Wu Yanni herself creates an environment conducive to these arrangements, where private entrepreneurship feeds on public contracts in a gray zone escaping traditional control mechanisms.

THIRD HYPOTHESIS: THE ABSENCE OF NARRATIVE COHERENCE

Beyond these technical and bureaucratic failures, the Baybridge network’s ineffectiveness reveals another deficiency: the absence of narrative coherence. While not all effective disinformation necessarily relies on serial mechanisms, the most sophisticated and impactful campaigns mobilize complex narrative architectures^(x). These operations deploy shared architexts^(x) and ‘narrative constellations’ that guide both the production and reception of meaning, and render manipulated information particularly compelling. The Baybridge network manifests a striking narrative cacophony. Chinese ‘positive energy’ discourses coexist incoherently with pro-Russian narratives, generating dissonances that fundamentally undermine credibility. The contradictory treatment of Xi Jinping’s visit to France exemplifies this absence of unified narrative grammar: positive portrayals from Chinese sources clash directly with hostile framings from Russian channels on the same platforms. More critically, these narratives fail to anchor themselves within pre-existing architexts that might lend them interpretive coherence. Unlike successful disinformation campaigns that tap into established narrative repertoires, the Baybridge content exists only as isolated fragments. These narrative shards lack connective tissue: no overarching storyline links disparate pieces, no thematic consistency emerges across episodes, no familiar patterns guide audience interpretation.

This architextual incoherence transforms what could be sophisticated influence infrastructure into a mere aggregator of disparate messages. Without the narrative scaffolding that enables audiences to construct meaning from partial information, technical sophistication becomes paradoxically counterproductive. The network multiplies the distribution of contradictory fragments that, lacking any narrative thread to weave them together, cancel each other out rather than reinforce a coherent worldview. The Baybridge network’s failure thus confirms, through negative examples, the crucial importance of narrative architecture in information operations. Technical capacity without narrative competence produces noise, not influence.

THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

These three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and likely reveal complementary dynamics. Technical incompetence could result from the primacy accorded to political connections over professional expertise in contract attribution. Conversely, the bureaucratic logic of numbers could discourage any investment in the qualitative improvement of a system whose ineffectiveness does not affect operator remuneration. This analysis raises fundamental questions about the heterogeneous nature of China’s informational influence apparatus. While ambitions are manifest and investments considerable, the execution by these particular actors reveals systemic flaws that distinguish opportunistic commercial operations from state-directed influence campaigns. It would be erroneous, however, to extrapolate from this case study a general assessment of Chinese capabilities. When strategic priorities are at stake and professional intelligence services or central propaganda department assume direct control, China has demonstrated considerably greater sophistication and effectiveness. The contrast between the amateurism observed in this network and the documented capabilities of other entities suggests that we are witnessing a peripheral manifestation of a multi-tiered system, where resource allocation and operational competence correlate directly with perceived strategic importance. This study ultimately serves to demystify the abstract entities that populate contemporary discourse on information warfare. Behind the often mythologized ‘Chinese influence operations’ to which Western analysts frequently attribute near-omnipotent capabilities, our investigation reveals a more prosaic reality: second-tier actors operating with

limited competence and negligible effectiveness. The granular examination of individual operators like Wu Yanni and Zhu Haisong (local entrepreneurs leveraging political connections for commercial gain rather than master strategists orchestrating sophisticated influence campaigns) underscores the analytical imperative of moving beyond aggregate threat assessments toward actor-specific analysis. This differentiation is not merely academic; it carries significant policy implications. The conflation of all Chinese information operations into a monolithic threat risks both resource misallocation and strategic miscalculation. By contrast, the methodical decryption of these networks enables the identification of genuinely sophisticated operations that merit serious countermeasures, while exposing the Potemkin villages of digital influence that, despite their technical infrastructure, pose minimal actual threat to democratic discourse. These lessons invite not only a critical reassessment of the real disinformation capabilities attributed to authoritarian state actors, but also a reflection on our own performative role as researchers and analysts. The tendency toward rhetorical inflation in describing Chinese (or Russian) informational threats risks creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, where our alarmist discourse shapes public perceptions and legitimizes disproportionate responses to sometimes overestimated threats. This epistemic responsibility demands redoubled empirical rigor, scrupulously distinguishing proven capabilities from anxiety-driven projections. The continuation of such granular investigations thus constitutes not only a scholarly necessity but a strategic imperative, allowing democratic societies to calibrate their responses proportionally to actual rather than imagined threats. Ultimately, the Baybridge case illustrates the limits of a decentralized, commercially driven approach to influence that neglects cultural and editorial dimensions in favor of a purely quantitative logic. This particular network’s failures should not obscure the broader reality of Chinese information operations, which encompass both these ineffective commercial ventures and highly sophisticated state-directed campaigns. It also reveals how bureaucratic pathologies can transform an instrument of soft power into a theater of private enrichment, emptying the initial geopolitical ambition of its substance. These lessons invite a critical reassessment of the real disinformation capabilities attributed to authoritarian state actors, while underscoring the necessity of understanding the internal logics that govern their deployment.

ANATOMY OF A CHINESE INFORMATION INFLUENCE ECOSYSTEM

Tadaweb and Paul Charon

Behind the façade of innocuous digital marketing firms operating from China’s Greater Bay Area lies a vast ecosystem of information manipulation targeting audiences across dozens of countries. This study unveils BAYBRIDGE, an infrastructure whose technical sophistication stands in striking contrast to its operational dysfunction. This research maps the network’s architecture, traces its connections to Chinese state propaganda apparatus, and decrypts the discourse strategies deployed toward foreign publics. It reveals how companies exploit hundreds of inauthentic news websites to disseminate content aligned with Beijing’s—and Moscow’s—interests. Yet the system betrays fundamental contradictions. Chinese “positive energy” narratives promoting harmony coexist chaotically with aggressive pro-Kremlin propaganda. Poor translations, absent editorial oversight, and narrative incoherence render the operation remarkably ineffective. This paradox illuminates crucial questions: Does incompetence explain the failure, or does bureaucratic rent-seeking transform geopolitical ambition into private enrichment theater? This work demystifies authoritarian information capabilities while demonstrating the imperative of actor-specific analysis. A contribution to understanding disinformation ecosystems and the pathologies that limit their effectiveness.